Public economic perfectionism: the moral fallacy of economic development

Abstract

There exists an idea, present not only in political culture but also in laws and other aspects of social life, that decisions must consider their overall economic impact. Many people, ideologies, and legal frameworks promote the belief that we ought to prioritize what benefits the economy of society—sometimes above all else. The underlying reasoning can be summarized as follows: given two alternatives, A and B, if A is economically better than B for society, then A ought to be chosen. I call this type of reasoning the Public Economic Perfectionism (PEP) fallacy.

The PEP fallacy represents faulty reasoning for two main reasons. First, it depends on how one interprets the claim that A is economically better than B—an assertion that can be vague, context-dependent, or empirically uncertain. Second, it can lead us to endorse outcomes that are immoral or contrary to human rights.

My analysis begins by examining naturally occurring or enthymematic PEPs, in which some premises are implicit. By making these assumptions explicit, we can see how certain premises are false or dubious from moral or legal perspectives, or ambiguous both economically and ethically.

Finally, I present examples from Mexican legislation that could, intentionally or not, justify what are in fact fallacious PEPs—cases where economic reasoning is given undue moral or legal authority. This examination shows how deeply the PEP fallacy can influence policymaking, revealing the tension between economic rationality and ethical or human rights considerations.