Conceptos y esquemas en la argumentación.

Fabián Bernache Maldonado

Authors

Fabián Bernache Maldonado Universidad de Guadalajara

Keywords:

Reasons., Judgments., Arguments., Concept application, Cognition.

Abstract

In this work, we claim that our capacity to form judgments is the main factor that explains our practical knowledge of the logical dimension of argumentation, that is our capacity to identify relevant reasons that are able to support our assertions or to refute the assertions of an interlocutor with whom we disagree. The capacity to form judgments presupposes a kind of sensibility to the rational restrictions or norms that regulate the application of our concepts and it is this kind of sensibility that enables us to identify good reasons in order to support or refute assertions. Our proposal is compared with the influential proposal of argumentation schemes, mainly defended by Douglas Walton. The aim of this comparative strategy is to show the advantages of our proposal, for we claim that it is not only more simple, but that it enables also to explain the functioning and rationality of Walton´s argumentation schemes and to solve some of their dissatisfactions

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