Argumentative analysis of the Meno dialogue.

Abstract

This article presents an argumentative analysis of Plato’s Meno, pursuing both pedagogical and thematic aims. The author argues that courses on Platonic dialogues often emphasize doctrinal content while neglecting the argumentative forms through which such content is defended. In response, the study examines some of the main arguments in the Meno using different analytical methods, not as a definitive interpretation, but as an initial approach open to further refinement. The analysis begins with the construction of a thematic index to identify the dialogue’s central issues, particularly the definition of virtue, the problem of knowledge, and the question of whether virtue can be taught. It then offers a detailed examination of the Socratic elenchi, showing how Socrates leads Meno from inadequate definitions to the exposure of internal contradictions. The article also analyzes the role of the myth of recollection as a solution to the problem of knowledge, as well as the systematic use of the hypothetical method as a significant argumentative innovation in Plato’s thought. The study concludes that in the Meno, virtue is not teachable in a strict sense but is acquired as a divine gift through true belief, highlighting the dialogue’s methodological richness and its importance in the development of Platonic philosophy.