Naming and Kripke's necessity: Between proper names and definite descriptions.

Abstract

This article provides a systematic exposition of the main theses developed by Saul A. Kripke in Naming and Necessity, focusing on the semantic status of proper names and their distinction from definite descriptions. The author begins with an introductory overview of Kripke’s life and work, emphasizing his impact on modal logic and contemporary philosophy of language. The article then reconstructs the classical debate with Frege, Russell, and Searle regarding the theory of descriptions, according to which proper names are understood as descriptive abbreviations endowed with meaning. Against this view, the study presents Kripke’s critique, arguing that proper names lack descriptive meaning and function instead as rigid designators, referring to the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. The notion of possible worlds and its heuristic role are explained, along with the distinction between rigid and accidental designators, in order to show why definite descriptions fail to fix reference and meaning adequately. Finally, the article examines the implications of this position for identity statements, necessity, contingency, and modal semantics. The study concludes that Kripke’s proposal marks a decisive break with classical descriptivism and stands as one of the most influential contributions to twentieth-century analytic philosophy.