Seeing what is seen: the attribution of self-consciousness to animals.
Keywords:
Self-consciousness, Animal self-consciousness, José Luis Bermúdez, Mirror test, Episodic memoryAbstract
The aim of the paper consists on the problematic nature of the attribution of self-consciousness to
non-human animals. In particular, three different paths are discussed: attribution on the basis of
language, on the basis of certain experiments that do not require linguistic skills, and on the basis of
the mere possession of phenomenal consciousness. While all of them provide strong reasons for the
attribution of self-consciousness, they also lead to serious problems. This paper argues that there is
no infallible criterion for the attribution of self-consciousness, as well as that the view that self-
consciousness is a defining human trait is questionable.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2022 Alejandro Villamor Iglesias
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
You are free to:
- Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format
- Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material
- The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
- Attribution — You must give appropriate credit , provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made . You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
- NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes .
- No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
