Heidegger's reading of the concept of time in Physics IV

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine how Heidegger interprets and criticizes Aristotle’s concept of time as presented in Physics IV, and to ask in what sense this reading transforms, extends, or surpasses the conception of time as “the number of motion according to the before and after” (219b 1 – 2). The aim is to clarify how the temporality of Dasein relates to the Aristotelian definition and to the philosophical tradition it inaugurates. The paper is organized into three sections: 1) We reconstruct the essential points of Physics IV concerning the nature of time; 2) we analyse Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Aristotelian time in Being and Time, where the distinction between original temporality and the vulgar concept of time is introduced; 3) we examine the Natorp Report in order to show that Heidegger’s reflection on Aristotle does not arise ex nihilo, but rather forms part of a broader process of intellectual maturation. We propose that, despite Heidegger’s critique of the “vulgar” conception of time, he preserves fundamental elements of Aristotle’s definition, reinterpreting them through the existential lens of Dasein’s temporality.