Deep disagreements and hinge propositions. Three versions of non-epistemicism.

Abstract

So-called deep disagreements are particularly resistant to rational resolution. According to pessimists they are indeed irresolvable. Optimists oppose them. Within wittgenstenian approaches to the phenomenon there is a simple way of arguing for pessimism that appeals to a non-epistemicist thesis about our relation to hinge commitments. However, the available varieties of this thesis are, as will be shown, problematic. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the pessimistic argument can be discarded since there is an alternative way of articulating non-epistemicism that does not suffer from the defects that afflict such varieties. It is worth clarifying that I am not going to argue for the truth of non-epistemicism. I will focus on studying three versions of the idea and I will defend the superiority of one of them. To the extent that non-epistemicism is plausible, for wittgensteinians, pessimism remains a reasonable thesis.