Criticism of Lakatos' induction principle

Abstract

This article examines Theodor Viehweg’s proposal concerning the three ways of thinking about legal science, aiming to clarify the different theoretical levels from which law can be analyzed philosophically and to specify the role of the idea of justice within each of them. Drawing on two key essays by the German author, the study distinguishes between legal dogmatics, understood as a non-philosophical level focused on certainty and the practical operation of positive law; the theory of justice, or theory of law in the “old sense,” which seeks to provide a normative foundation for the legal system based on a conception of what is just; and the theory of law in the “new sense,” associated with methodological positivism, which focuses on describing and analyzing how positive law functions while deliberately excluding axiological judgments. The article analyzes the specific functions of each level and their interrelations, emphasizing how the idea of justice operates as a higher dogma that grants identity, coherence, and hermeneutic guidance to the legal system. It also highlights the ongoing tension between the stabilizing force of legal dogmatics and the critical impulses arising from theories of justice and political theory. The article concludes by proposing a conceptual framework that clarifies the internal structure of philosophy of law and the pragmatic role of justice in contemporary legal systems.