THE GOOD FORTUNE OF PHENOMENOLOGY. INITIATION INTO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ORTEGA Y GASSET

Abstract

This article offers a critical examination of the complex and controversial relationship between José Ortega y Gasset and phenomenology, particularly the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, drawing on both Ortega’s own writings and the interpretations proposed by his main commentators. Through a historical-philosophical and textual analysis, the study argues that much of the debate surrounding Ortega’s supposed adherence to, abandonment of, or break with phenomenology stems from his own retrospective self-interpretations, which are marked by ambiguity and inconsistency. The author demonstrates that, contrary to claims of an early rejection, Ortega was deeply and coherently grounded in phenomenology between 1913 and 1916, a period during which he adopted Husserlian methods, concepts, and problems as the foundation of his philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, the article maintains that even after Ortega’s gradual critical distancing—particularly from 1929 onward—his mature philosophy retained key phenomenological elements, such as the primacy of lived experience, the search for evidence, and the ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science. The study concludes that phenomenology represents a decisive legacy in the formation of Ortega’s thought, although this does not justify labeling him an orthodox phenomenologist, but rather a thinker who critically engages with phenomenology in order to develop an original philosophical project.