Leibniz’s Account of Contingency.

Authors

Keywords:

Analytic, God, Necessity, Possible world, Synthetic, Truth

Abstract

In this paper I examine the problem of how there can be a place for contingent facts in Leibniz’s
philosophical system. The problem has two sources. The first is Leibniz’s definition of truth and the
second is the cosmological role that Leibniz allocates to God. Both seem to make every truth and fact
necessary, as many authors have recognized. However, I argue that despite all the difficulties that his
system offered for this task, Leibniz managed to solve, with great originality, this problem. I claim
that two of the keys for this solution are his notion of possible worlds and his distinction among
different varieties of necessity.

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Published

2025-08-26

How to Cite

González Varela, E. (2025). Leibniz’s Account of Contingency. Sincronía, 26(82), 35–50. Retrieved from https://revistasincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/index.php/sincronia/article/view/337

Issue

Vol. 26 No. 82 (2022): Sincronia Journal

Section

PHILOSOPHY

License

Copyright (c) 2022 Edgar González Varela

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