ISSN: 1562-384X
Year XXIX / Issue 88. July-December 2025
DOI: 10.32870/sincronia.axxix.n88

Revista Sincronía

Biannual Journal of Philosophy, Literary Studies and Humanities

Philosophy

The *scientific philosophy* and the resolution of philosophical problems.

La *filosofía científica* y la resolución de problemas filosóficos.

 DOI: 10.32870/sincronia.axxix.n88.3.25b

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Received: 05/03/2025 **Revised**: 26/05/2025 **Approved**: 06/06/2025

Abstract:
In this article, we defend the perspective of scientific philosophy, highlighting its relevance in the resolution of contemporary philosophical problems. It is also argued that philosophical knowledge has advanced significantly, albeit differently from particular sciences. We suggest that philosophical theories should be in accordance with established scientific knowledge, emphasizing the importance of theoretical fertility. We will conclude that philosophy informed by science allows for robust responses to complex philosophical problems, promoting a fruitful dialogue between science and philosophy. We end the article with a brief reflection on the role of historical research in philosophy.

Keywords: Scientific philosophy. Coherence. Fertility. Science. History.

Resumen.
En este artículo defenderemos la perspectiva de la filosofía científica, destacando su relevancia en la resolución de problemas filosóficos contemporáneos. Se argumenta que el conocimiento filosófico ha avanzado significativamente, aunque de manera diferente a las ciencias particulares. Sugerimos que las teorías filosóficas deben estar en concordancia con el conocimiento científico establecido, destacando la importancia de la fertilidad teórica. Concluiremos que la filosofía informada por la ciencia permite ofrecer respuestas robustas a problemas filosóficos complejos,

How to cite this article (APA):

In paragraph (parenthetical citation):
(Budeguer, 2025, p. __).

In reference list:
Budeguer, M. (2025). *Scientific philosophy* and philosophical problem solving. *Synchrony Journal*. *XXIX*(88). 45-62
DOI: 10.32870/sincronia.axxix.n88.3.25b

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promoviendo un diálogo fructífero entre ciencia y filosofía. Finalizamos el artículo con una breve reflexión en torno al papel de la investigación histórica en filosofía.

Palabras clave: Filosofía científica. Coherencia. Fertilidad. Ciencia. Historia

Birth of scientific philosophy

In the present contribution we would like to defend a way of doing philosophy that has recently gained much notoriety in the Spanish-speaking philosophical community, *scientific philosophy* or *scientifically informed* philosophy, and to state some reasons why we understand it to be an adequate approach to address philosophical questions.[1]

Rational scrutiny of the world emerged in Miletus, on the Ionian coast, around the 6th century BC. There emerged, with the speculations of Thales and his disciples (Anaximander, Anaximenes), the first *non-mythological* worldviews of which we are aware. It is not possible, of course, to indicate a precise date when the West began to reflect critically, by means of rational examination, on nature, although we can be sure that here began a path that has not stopped until today.[2]

Of those pre-Socratics, *the first who philosophized*, following the words of Aristotle (*cf. Metaphysics* 983b), we preserve only a few second-hand commentaries, texts that the specialized literature has called "fragments". Beyond the differences established in this respect by the doxographers, what is clear is that, at this point in space and time, in the Greece of the sixth century B.C., philosophy was born, and an extremely incipient form of what we now call *science* (a concept designated by the Greek term ἐπιστήμη). With these early thinkers, the West would learn a lesson that even the most modern scientific theories

[1] This essay is primarily inspired by the contributions of Gustavo E. Romero (2017, 2018) and Mario Bunge (1974 - 1989), a well-known advocate of a philosophy informed by scientific advances.

[2] Note the mention of the West. The various historiographical studies of recent times have indicated with a very high degree of certainty that in the East (India, China, Japan) philosophical reflection emerged some time earlier. Avoiding to dwell on historical matters, we have decided to simplify our exposition at this point.

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retain: the idea that our knowledge about the world has to be based on experience and reason, and not on what is affirmed, *e.g.,* by the old traditions.

In the classical stage, with the systems of Plato and Aristotle, ethical concerns began to acquire even greater importance, to the point that, during most of the Hellenistic period, with the crisis and fall of the classical world, the main concerns were of an ethical nature. The Stoic division of philosophy into three fundamental branches is well known: logic, physics and ethics. The central question was "how to live", and all the knowledge acquired about the world - provided by physics - was ultimately aimed at answering that question. While serious objections could be raised against the simplified approach we have adopted in this reconstruction of the origins of philosophy, we believe it is both useful for our purposes and historically accurate.

We believe that the key to understanding the course of philosophical thought today is to be found in the nineteenth century. There we find a double tendency: on the one hand, from the work of Kant and the enormous influence of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, romantic and idealistic thought began to gain momentum in Europe; on the other hand, there is a strong reaction to the work of idealistic authors, represented, above all, by scientists such as R. Avenarius and L. Büchner. Romanticism can be understood, at least in its expressions in the field of philosophy, as a reaction to the Enlightenment ideals of the 18th century. In European university philosophy, this current is represented above all by the *absolute idealism* of G.W.F. Hegel, an important author who proposed a great metaphysical synthesis between the subjective idealism of Fichte and the objective idealism of Schelling.[3]

In contrast to the ontology of the medieval and modern authors that preceded him (*e.g.* Descartes, Locke, Hume), the Hegelian dialectic - which could very well be criticized for its lack of expository clarity - stressed the dynamic character of reality and emphasized the intersubjective aspect of human knowledge. While some of Hegel's ideas are valuable, since he dealt with really important problems, his way of doing philosophy, divorced from the science of his time and from experience, contrasts greatly with what we would call a *desirable*

[3] For more details on the contributions of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, *cf.* Romero et. al. (2022, pp. 43 - 51).

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philosophy[4] . The Hegelian system, in short, reveals itself to be infertile when applied to reality. Famously, Popper (2013) would criticize Hegelianism for its detachment from reality and lack of explanatory power.

It is commonplace of analytical thinkers to criticize Hegel for his lack of expository clarity. We do not believe that it implies, *ipso facto*, that his considerations are not, to some extent, worthy of note. We have decided to introduce, by way of example, a quotation from the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* in which Hegel expresses himself in an obscure way about the concept of electricity. It is only one example among many that can be found in the works of the German thinker:

> What constitutes the difficulty of the concept of electricity is, on the one hand, the fundamental determination of the inertia, as physical as it is mechanical, of the bodily individual within this process. For this reason, the electric tension is attributed to another, to a matter to which light belongs, and which is produced in an abstract manner, separated from the concrete reality of the body that remains in its self-sufficiency (Hegel, 2005, p. 384).

In the *Encyclopedia* it is possible to find several texts of this kind, obscure in their wording. This shows that, while Hegelian philosophy may be valuable in many respects, it does not prove to have been informed to any notable extent by the developments of the time.

The Hegelian philosophical system was, in our view, one of the most influential on contemporary philosophy, and that is why any student of philosophy or practitioner of the discipline must confront its most important speculations. From Hegelianism have emerged currents such as existentialism, postmodernism, structuralism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis (Lacanian), Marxism, Heideggerian ontological critique, among many others.

[4] Hegel's main contribution, in our opinion, is in the field of the history of philosophy. His contributions in this field are decisive, since they are pioneering in their genre. No one before him had attempted, at least with his level of systematicity, a reconstruction of the thought that preceded him. Many of his ideas on the philosophy of religion are equally remarkable. In this regard, see Ramírez Daza and García (2019). S. Houlgate, an important contemporary scholar of Hegel's philosophy, has proposed that Hegelian thought did help, to an important extent, the science of the time. On this point, *cf.* Houlgate (2005; 2006).

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As Beiser (2005) and Magee (2008) point out, the dialectical logic, the historical conception of knowledge and the idea of self-consciousness deployed by Hegel have constituted a common philosophical background for many of these traditions, either by affinity or by critical opposition. Postmodernism has maintained an ambiguous relationship with Hegelian dialectics: despite its explicit rejection of grand narratives and historical teleology, it has inherited from Hegel a sensitivity to the historicity of thought and to the critique of traditional metaphysical categories. However, these currents - and especially postmodernism - have been subject to strong criticism, being considered empty or even harmful when one tries to apply them to concrete social contexts (*cf.* Ferraris, 2013). By the 1840s, however, German idealism was beginning to lose strength in its country of origin: dialectics, in the face of the progress of mathematics and the physical-natural sciences, was beginning to be perceived as a sterile knowledge when contrasted with empirical reality.

In the middle of the 19th century, then, authors emerged who promoted the use of formal tools and a philosophy informed by the science of the time. It was at this moment that scientific philosophy was properly born, at least in the sense in which we understand it in the present contribution (*cf.* Richardson, 1997). The authors who participated in this *reaction to idealism* were diverse, but among them we can mention Gottlob Frege, Ernst Mach, Hermann von Helmholtz, Charles S. Peirce, Carl Vogt, Ludwig Büchner, among many others. The function of philosophy, for these thinkers, was simple: to help solve the more general problems that arose in the study of the natural world, providing a fundamental framework for addressing the problems of the sciences. Contrary to Hegel, these thinkers understood that a philosophy detached from science is not *true philosophy*. Science and philosophy must walk hand in hand and not oppose or distance themselves from each other. A philosophy informed by the scientific advances of its time is, properly speaking, a scientific philosophy.

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Characterization of scientific philosophy

This philosophy that we have briefly characterized *ut supra* was successfully realized in the twentieth century thanks to the contribution of several philosophers. Among them we find names such as Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, Mario Bunge, Nicholas Rescher, among many others. This way of doing philosophy contrasts with other tendencies already mentioned. Philosophy has not always been inspired by science - and, at times, has been opposed to it. We understand that this is a mistake, mainly because a philosophy that does not consider the scientific advances of its time can hardly aspire to satisfy any important philosophical problem. Currents such as extreme contemporary skepticism or postmodernism have not helped the advancement of knowledge.

While these currents remain quite popular in some sectors of the humanities, they do not usually bother to contrast their results with advances in physical science, neuroscience, biology or psychology. A typical claim of postmodernism - and of many professional philosophers - is the idea that there is no such thing as truth, only *my truth*. Interestingly, this absurd relativism contrasts comically with a moral absolutism, in which all opinions are to be respected regardless of the reasons offered for holding them[5] . Contradictions of this kind suggest that a flawed and contradictory philosophy has, in turn, unintended ethical consequences. Considering the progress of science, it is possible to avoid errors of this kind by formulating a philosophy that is coherent with itself and with the available scientific knowledge.

Now, it is worth emphasizing the following: the scientific philosophy that we have been describing does not aspire to be a science, but rather to approach philosophical problems taking into account scientific advances. In the same way, a scientist trained in philosophy will be able to approach the problems posed by research in a better way. This proposal implies assuming, in a certain sense, scientists, that is, the philosophical conception according to which scientific research is the best way to ensure precise factual knowledge

[5] For a refutation of this position see the article by Haack (1995). There the claim that truth is not an important matter for philosophy is taken to its ultimate consequences and the problems that this position generates (both from the semantic and epistemological point of view and in practical terms) are evaluated.

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about the world (Bunge, 2005, p. 24). But this position does not imply, as is sometimes thought, that science is infallible, or that it is the only available source of knowledge. This last position, defended by authors such as Hawking (2010) or Dawkins (2007) could be called extreme scientists. This is not the view we intend to sustain in this essay. The above statement also implies that there are philosophical problems that cannot be addressed by the sciences and have to be solved and investigated with the tools of scientifically informed philosophy.

The relationship proposed between the two fields, science and philosophy, is one of complementarity, not identity (F ≠ C). Since science evolves with the passage of time, so should philosophy. Any researcher should have the ability to change his or her positions in the face of contrary evidence, and this is a virtue that is also valid for those who do research in philosophy. Scientific philosophy, in other words, aspires to be dynamic, and to evolve with our available knowledge about the world. To combat the obscure terminology with which Hegelian-oriented philosophers tend to express themselves, *e.g.,* the proposal is to use formal tools that bring clarity to the discourse and reduce its vagueness as much as possible. This does not imply, of course, trying to formalize everything, but rather to apply the instruments of formal languages where they are most fruitful. After all, this is the procedure that has served the sciences best.

The philosophical problems that scientific philosophy recognizes are those that arise from its main branches (Romero, 2017, p. 100): logic, which studies the relation of inference between the premises and the conclusion of reasoning; semantics, which studies general problems about languages; ontology, which studies the nature of existents and the structure of reality; epistemology, or gnoseology, which asks about the nature of knowledge; ethics, which investigates the justification and origin of moral norms; aesthetics, which asks about the aesthetic experience, among others[6] . Some of the problems that can be addressed by

[6] These are the five basic branches recognized by G.E. Romero. I believe, however, that it is possible to broaden the field of action of the scientifically oriented philosopher, and to include within this approach other classical branches of philosophy such as political philosophy, philosophy of law, social philosophy, anthropology, etc. Naturally, it is possible to think of multiple subdivisions within the main branches mentioned.

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scientific philosophy are the following: what is the truth? What is the law of nature? What is knowledge? How does science differ froHowseudoscience? What are values? Can computers think? What many others.

This last point, about genuinely philosophical problem solving, differentiates scientific philosophy from logical positivism, a school of thought with which it is often confusing. Two other points are central in differentiating scientific philosophy from the philosophy of the Vienna Circle: namely, the approach advocated here accepts metaphysics and believes that it is possible to formulate it in clear and precise terms (Bunge, 1971). Volumes 3 and 4 of Mario Bunge's *Treatise on Basic Philosophy* are thus devoted to it. On the other hand, it is not true that the only function of philosophy is conceptual clarification, *pace* Carnap. In this sense, scientific philosophy is not purely "analytic", but also "synthetic", in the sense that it proposes genuine philosophical theories, and does not merely aspire to logically analyze the elements of our language -although this may be an important moment in the resolution of philosophical problems (*cf.* Teixidó Durán and Carcacía, 2024).

We believe that what has been stated so far allows us, therefore, to combat the *cliché* so often repeated about progress in philosophy. Even among professional philosophers it is often said that philosophy deals with the same problems as in its origins, and that no progress has been made in solving them. This assertion perhaps has its origin in that famous quote by A.N. Whitehead that the whole philosophical tradition is but a footnote to Plato's thought (Whitehead, 1985, p. 39). We believe this is a mistake; it is not true that no progress has been made in philosophical knowledge. What happens is that the mode of evaluation and revision of philosophical hypotheses and theories is not the same as that used by the sciences. A philosophical proposal must be evaluated according to its internal or logical coherence, on the one hand, and its external coherence (with other fields of knowledge) on the other (*cf.* Teixidó Durán, 2021). Thus, it would not make much sense to formulate, *e.g.,* an ontological theory that contradicts our more established knowledge in physical or biological sciences. The fertility of philosophical theories is another of the basic

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requirements to which we must pay attention if we wish to produce effective advances in knowledge.

We will take as an example to illustrate this point the theories of truth, an important chapter of philosophical semantics (partially overlapping with gnoseology). What we will call here the theory of *my truth* can be understood as a derivation of certain relativistic positions developed within the framework of postmodern thought. According to this conception, there would be as many truths as individuals, and the statement "this is true for me" admits no more justification than the fact that it is held by a subject. This attitude corresponds, in part, to the rejection of metanarratives and universal criteria of truth, as stated by Jean-François Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition* (1979), where he maintains that "[...] postmodernity is defined as incredulity towards metanarratives" (Lyotard, 1979, p. 7). Similarly, Richard Rorty proposed replacing the notion of truth with that of *contextual justification*, affirming that there is no privileged access to reality, but only more or less useful discourses within a given community (*cf.* Rorty, 1989). Michel Foucault, for his part, argued that each society has its regime of truth and that what we call truth is always imbricated with power relations (*cf.* Foucault, 1992).

From the philosophical approach proposed here, it is worth asking what is the fecundity of such a theory: to what new questions can it lead us? Our answer is that, at least in the field of science and philosophy, this type of position does not provide productive criteria for the advancement of knowledge. Assuming that truth is purely subjective leads to the rejection of critical judgment, argumentation and rational debate. Suppose a scientist were to adopt this perspective: when questioned about how he obtained his results, his only defense would be "these are my results; it is my truth. If you disagree, respect them". Such a position implies abandoning rational dialogue, blurring the boundary between belief and knowledge, and canceling any possibility of intersubjective correction. We believe, on the other hand, that no one can consistently sustain this attitude in everyday life: sooner or later, reality imposes itself and requires us to rectify. Paradoxically, those who defend this position as an expression of tolerance do not realize that, by renouncing the common criterion, they

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are eliminating the framework that allows genuine dissent and are heading towards incoherence or even dogmatism disguised as pluralism.

With formal tools, Tarski, Bunge and others have managed to develop theories of truth well-grounded in current knowledge[7] , solving that old problem that once seemed insoluble[8] . The synergy we have established between science and philosophy implies, on the other hand, that philosophers should have a minimum understanding of the scientific field closest to their area of research; the scientist, on the other hand, should be philosophically trained if he wishes to produce science that is clearly formulated. Thus, *e.g.,* one who engages in research in epistemology should be minimally trained in advances in neuroscience, trying, therefore, that his speculations are based on the latest scientific contributions in this regard. In the same way, whoever tries to approach the ontological problematic ignoring the advances of the physical sciences produces nothing but *flatus vocis*, expressions that cannot have any effective application in the whole of our knowledge about the world.

We believe that Bertrand Russell's conception illustrates very well the philosophy we have been defending up to this point. In a compilation published in 1952, the English philosopher stated the following: "The kind of philosophy which I value and have endeavored to pursue is *scientific* in the sense that there is some determinate knowledge to be gained and that new discoveries may make the admission of past errors inevitable" (1952, p. v). Russell's view seems indeed sensible; if the views of scientists change in the face of new evidence, so should the views of philosophers. Of course, because of the very nature of scientific research, all knowledge is always conjectural and transitory. There is no definitive theory about nature. But what we can in fact aspire to is to obtain a (partially) true knowledge

[7] Tarski did so in the field of formal sciences in a classic article, *The Semantic Conception of Truth* (1944). Bunge extended the analysis to the realm of truth in the factual sciences. Much remains to be done in the field of semantics, but these advances show the possibility of *progress* in philosophical knowledge.

[8] This is not to say that there are no great advances to be made in this area. What we mean is that we have been able to *glimpse* (partially) true *answers* about this issue. Under this conception, to continue to hold whimsically to a *relativistic theory* such as the one outlined *ut supra* would seem inexplicable.

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of reality. Philosophy that aspires to be rigorous and useful should not, therefore, disregard the scientific advances of its time, even if they are, as we said, provisional.

We can define, under these conditions, what philosophy is -or perhaps, what it *should aspire to be*. It is the field of knowledge that inquiries into the most general concepts, such as knowledge, truth, meaning, thing, substance, matter, space, time, explanation, understanding, among many others. We have already detailed its main branches. Scientifically informed philosophy is that which aspires to be in accordance with the scientific knowledge of its time, although this is always revisable. It is a philosophy that can be critically evaluated by means of its internal and external coherence. From this perspective, whoever does research, *e.g.,* in the branch of philosophy of biology, should be minimally trained in the latest developments in the biology of his time.

Historical research in philosophy

We would like, finally, to analyze the role of historical research in the field of scientific philosophy. A key distinction to emphasize is the difference between research in philosophy as a critical and conceptual activity and research in the history of philosophy as a scholarly reconstruction of past ideas. In this sense, we maintain that, although the history of philosophy is an indispensable discipline for the rigorous cultivation of thought, its purpose does not necessarily consist in the production of original theories.

We understand that the researcher who aspires to dedicate himself to research in the history of philosophy should, therefore, be deeply trained in those auxiliary fields for his task[9] . Thus, *e.g.,* he who intends to investigate the history of Greek philosophy needs to know deeply the Greek language, the Greek religion, the political history of Greece, the most advanced historiography of his field, etc. But he who investigates the history of a field does not necessarily formulate original philosophical theories. This confusion, so common in

[9] An example of seriously approached historical research in philosophy can be found in the recent work of Graham (2006) and his contributions to the understanding of the philosophy of the early pre-Socratics. His compilation of the fragments of the Presocratic thinkers (*cf.* Graham, 2010) incorporates rigorous standards of historiographical research, slowly, at least, replacing the classic edition of Diels and Kranz.

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philosophy, does not arise in science. Whoever devotes himself to the history of physics does not, strictly speaking, research in physics, but reconstructs completely the history of physical thought. We believe that, in the same way, historical research in philosophy should be properly evaluated as research that refers to the history of thought, and not to the resolution of contemporary problems in philosophy, scientific or otherwise.

Authors such as Martha Nussbaum (*cf.* Nussbaum, 1997) have defended the importance of dialogue with the classics, but not from an attitude of uncritical veneration, but to illuminate our current questions. Thus, our thesis does not deny the value of historical study but rather questions its confusion with philosophical practice properly. As Deleuze (*cf.* Deleuze, 2002), a contemporary French philosopher, argues, doing philosophy involves creating concepts, and not merely interpreting or commenting on them, in the manner of ancient commentators. Historical commentary, although valuable and necessary, must be understood as a preliminary or auxiliary instance, not as the ultimate horizon of philosophical work.

This point is especially relevant if we aspire to a scientifically informed philosophy. The contemporary development of disciplines such as mathematical logic, theoretical biology or cognitive sciences has greatly expanded the conceptual repertoire to which philosophy can resort to address its own problems. From this perspective, philosophers such as Ladyman and Ross (2007) have argued that philosophy must abandon certain traditional methodologies and take on, in earnest, the results and methods of the empirical sciences if it is to be epistemologically relevant. In this vein, the history of philosophy, while formative, cannot substitute for critical inquiry oriented to the present.

A specialist in Kantian philosophy, *e.g.,* is one who has an in-depth knowledge of Kant's thought, and while he may be able to make critical evaluations of it, he does not thereby address or attempt to solve a current philosophical problem. Although it is relevant that the researcher in philosophy knows in depth the history of his discipline, avoiding making the mistakes that others made in the past, we believe it is necessary to note that there are current problems in thought that cannot be reduced to historical research. The

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latter must be the starting point of many contemporary inquiries, although we do not believe that it should be the goal of philosophical research. The commentary of authors (*e.g.* "the fundamental of *x* in *y*") must therefore be properly balanced with the resolution of genuinely philosophical problems. The sciences understood this long ago. Perhaps it is time for philosophy to begin, then, to follow in the footsteps of its former disciple. Historical research is fundamental, and without it, philosophy is condemned to repeat old mistakes of the past. However, it is only the starting point, and not the final goal.

Whoever investigates, *e.g.,* some aspect of Aristotelian philosophy, should always bear in mind that historical inquiry should not necessarily imply conceptual adherence to the present. The history of philosophy, understood in its generality, is but a branch of the history of ideas, just as the history of music or architecture can be. Although we must always keep it in mind, the desirable thing is to approach the philosophical problems of the present with the modern tools of mathematical logic -and other formal sciences- and the sciences. Just as the architect does not look to the *history of architecture* for a step-by-step guide for his constructions, neither should the philosopher follow to the letter (all) the indications of thinkers of centuries ago. This brief essay has tried to show that a philosophy informed by science, and a science philosophically oriented, is extremely helpful for the advancement of our knowledge.

Final considerations

Throughout this contribution we have argued that scientific philosophy - or scientifically informed philosophy - constitutes an adequate, fruitful and necessary approach to contemporary philosophical problems. In contrast to other currents that have disassociated philosophy from empirical knowledge or that have rejected dialogue with the sciences, the proposal defended here assumes that a rational and critical philosophy must be nourished by the best knowledge available at any given time, which implies an attitude of openness and collaboration with the sciences. This attitude does not amount to an uncritical subordination to scientific results, but seeks a reciprocal interaction, in which philosophy can benefit from

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empirical and formal developments, and the sciences can avail themselves of the conceptual, logical and epistemological tools that the tradition has elaborated.

One of the main points we have emphasized is that scientific philosophy does not intend to replace the sciences or compete with them in its own field. It is not a matter of turning philosophy into an empirical science, but of recognizing that its object - the most general and abstract conceptual problems, such as those of truth, knowledge, being, value, meaning or justification - can and must be treated in coherence with contemporary scientific advances. This implies a double requirement: on the one hand, to avoid the use of obsolete, vague or ambiguous concepts; on the other hand, to develop analytical tools and philosophical models that dialogue with the results obtained by disciplines such as physics, biology, neurosciences or modern psychology. From this perspective, it is unsustainable to continue elaborating philosophical theories completely outside the empirical data or in open contradiction with the most established knowledge. We have already insisted that science is not the *only* mode of knowledge available, but it is a very remarkable and valuable one.

We have also pointed out that scientifically informed philosophy does not renounce traditional philosophical questions. On the contrary, it reformulates them in clearer, more rigorous and current terms, seeking to resolve them, or at least to specify them, by means of a systematic, coherent and fertile approach. This fertility is manifested in the capacity of a theory to generate new questions, propose plausible solutions and serve as a guide for future research. In this sense, the criterion of theoretical fertility becomes a key element in evaluating the productivity of philosophical work, in close relation to the internal (logical) and external (scientific) coherence of the proposals developed.

In contrast to philosophical positions that we have characterized as sterile or even harmful, such as extreme relativism, radical skepticism or a certain anti-scientific postmodernism, scientific philosophy is proposed as a rational and constructive alternative. Instead of renouncing the notion of truth or the ideal of objectivity, it reformulates them based on contemporary developments, as authors such as Tarski or Bunge have done. This reformulation does not ignore the historical and contextual dimension of knowledge, but

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neither does it abandon the aspiration to reach a deeper, more precise and justifiable understanding of the world. In this framework, rational debate, coherent argumentation and critical review become fundamental tools for the advancement of knowledge, both philosophical and scientific.

We have also argued that the history of philosophy, while fulfilling an indispensable function in philosophical training, should not be confused with philosophical research per se. We understand that rigorous training in the history of thought is necessary to avoid repeating past mistakes and to contextualize current discussions, but we consider that the ultimate goal of philosophy cannot be merely exegetical or commentary. Philosophy, if it is to be relevant, must set out to solve current problems by creating new concepts, theories and interpretative frameworks. It is this creative capacity that distinguishes philosophy as a living discipline, and not simply as a branch of historical scholarship.

Finally, we have affirmed that scientific philosophy is not a passing fad or a simple methodological label, but a certain *intellectual attitude* based on respect for evidence, conceptual clarity, logical rigor and commitment to truth. In a world where ethical, technological and epistemological challenges are multiplying, it is essential to have a philosophy that is up to these problems, capable of dialoguing with other knowledge and contributing to the understanding and rational orientation of human experience. This is the task that scientifically informed philosophy assumes, and which we believe it is urgent to vindicate in the contemporary philosophical context.

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